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SUMMARY 
An analysis has been made of Civil Aeronautics Administration 
and Civil Aeronautics Board commercial airplane fire records 
collected during the lO-year period ending July 1, 1948. The 
results of the analysis show that: 
1. Gasoline was most frequently the initial combustible ignited 
in flight and ground fires and is considered to be the most hazardous 
of the combustibles carried. 
2. Although electrical-ignition sources are the most frequent 
flight-fire ignit ion source by a small margin, the exhaust system 
is concluded to be the most hazardous ignition source because i t is 
necessarily located near the lubricating-oil and gasoline-plumbing 
systems and the resulting fires are relatively severe. The 
electrical-ignition sources usually involve only the electrical 
insulation and result in small-volume fires. The exhaust system 
was found to be the most frequent ground-fire ignition source. 
3. Engine failures were the most frequent cause of the union of 
combustible and ignition source that resulted in flight fires. 
4. Fuel-plumbing-system failures were the most frequent cause of 
fi r e s occurri ng during ground operation. 
5. The evidence concerning crash fires was not suffiCiently 
ext ensive to provide information concerning the factors that affect 
the start and the spread of fire. 
In order that future records may be more useful, all crash 
accidents should be studied to det~rmine why fire does or does not 
occur and to establish data that relate the occurrence and the spread 
of fire to airplane design and operation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Further improvement in aircraft safety by reducing the pos-
sibility of fire is recognized as a desirable objective by the 
aviation industry. Achievement of this aim is of interest to both 
commercial and military operators. A significant reduction in the 
fire hazard requires the establishment of engineering design 
criterions that will result in the best possible fire prevention 
and personnel safety. The NACA aircraft-fire research program, in 
coordination with research and development by other governmental 
agencies and the aviation industry, is directed toward this objective. 
One of the first steps in an attack on the airplane-fire problem 
should be a study of the records of past aircraft fires. The largest 
number of air-transport fire records immediately available were those 
collected by the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Civil 
Aeronautics Board. The information contained in these records was 
submitte~ by air-transport operators when scheduled aircraft were 
forced to deviate from the published schedule because of malfunction-
ing or failure of a mechanical part or when an accident had occurred. 
The Civil Aeronautics Board records are predominantly those prepared 
following the investigation of serious accidents. 
The records were studied to determine the relative frequency 
with which the various combustibles, ignition sources, and cause 
factors were involved in airplane fires so that remedial measures can 
be discovered and applied to those of first-order importance. The 
analysis covers 282 air-transport aircraft fires that occurred during 
the lO-year period ending July 1, 1948. The records analyzed include 
those of fires that occurred on air-transport-type airplanes being 
used for crew· training and orientation purposes 0 (This study does 
not include phases of the fire problem arising from military combat 
operations. ) 
ANALYSIS OF RECORDS 
Numerous combustibles are p~sent in the various systems and 
components of the airplane; ignition sources either exist continuously 
or may be produced by malfunctioning or failure of mechanical and 
electrical systems; and the airplane operates in an atmosphere con-
taining oxygen. All the components of fire are therefore present and 
need only be brought together for a fire to result. In a machine as 
intricate as the multiengine transport airplane with its numerous 
entwined and crowded mechanical and electrical systems, the mal-
functioning, failure, mishandling, or maldesign of a single system 
__ I 
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can easily cause the spilling of a combustible where it can reach 
an ignition source or the creation of an ignition source near a com-
bustible and thus eventually result in fire. Such malfunctioning, 
failure, mishandling, or maldesign is then the primary cause of the 
fire. It is not to be expected, however, that the same primary 
causes will be responsible for fire in all phases of airplane oper-
ation nor that all combustibles or ignition sources will be involved 
with equal frequency. The air-flow conditions, the power output, 
and the physical integrity of the aircraft structure will depend on 
whether the cause for the fire occurs during ground operation, 
flight operation, or a crash. Thus, consideration of the factors 
involved in the mechanism of an aircraft fire indicate the desir-
ability of knowing individually for flight, ground, and crash fires 
the relative frequency with which the various combustibles are 
initially involved, the relative frequency with which the various 
ignition sources are involved, the relative frequency with which the 
various systems malfunction and fail, and the prevalent combinations 
of combustible, ignition source, and malfunction or failure. 
On the basis of these prinCiples, the 282 cases were separated 
into ground, flight, and crash fire groups. The cases in each group 
were then analyzed to determine the relative frequencies with which 
each initial combustible, ignition source, and malfunction or fail-
ure was -involved in a fire. The final step was to determine which 
combinations of combustible, ignition source, and malfunction were 
prevalent. 
The proportional distribution of cammerical transport fires with 
respect to the operational phase in which they occurred is shown in 
the following table: 
Fires Cases Percent 
Flight 135 48 
Ground 82 29 
Crash 61 211 2 
Unknown 4 11 2 
Total 282 
Although the table gives the relative frequency with which the fires 
occurred, it does not indicate the relative importance of each group 
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with respect to personnel fatalities or damage to the aircraft 
involved. Ground fires, although second in frequency, were rarely 
fatal to personnel and seldom resulted in more than minor structural 
damage to the aircraft and are therefore the least important. Any 
fire may easily escape control, however, and the potential losses 
due to ground fires should not be overlooked. Flight fires were 
frequently extinguished and resulted in minor damage and no loss of 
life, but at other times resulted in complete destruction of the 
aircraft and its occupants. Crash fires have usually been more 
severe than flight fires and there is indication that crash fires 
may have been responsible for a larger number of deaths (reference 1). 
Combustibles. - The frequency with which the various inflammable 
materials serve as the initial combustible in flight fires is shown 
by the following table: 
Initial combustible Cases Percent of 
known cases 
Gasoline 30 27 
Electrical insulation 30 27 
Other solid 21 19~ 
Lubricating oil 17 15.1. 2 
Gasoline or lubricating oil 9 8 
Hydraulic fluid 3 3 
Unknown 25 
Total 135 
The percentage figures show that gasoline and electrical insulation 
were involved with equal frequency. In order to obtain the true 
significance of gasoline as the initial combustible, however, part 
of the 8 percent listed under gasoline or lubricating oil (exact 
determination of initial combustible was impossible in the case of 
these engine-failure fires) must be added to the 27 percent for 
gasoline, thus making gasoline the most frequent initial combustible 
by a small margin. Furthermore, a study of the individual cases 
shows that more severe damage is associated with gasoline fires in 
flight than with electrical-insulation fires. Consequently, gasoline is 
concluded to be the most hazardous as well as the most frequent 
initial combustible. 
Totaling of the various percentages shows that gasoline and 
lubricating oil are initially involved in half of all flight fires. 
Addition of the electrical insulation percentage brings the fraction 
to three-fourths of the total; thus the majority of all flight fires 
start with one of these three combustibles. 
N 
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The miscellaneous solid combustibles included a wide range of 
materials, of which the following is a partial list: baggage, nap 
on cockpit lining, kapok insulation, oil hoses, cooking grease, 
heater ducts, rubber carburetor collar, magnesium generator shaft, 
paper towels, and seat upholstery. This wide range indicates that 
every combustible material used in aircraft construction or operation 
must be scrutinized as a possible fire hazard. 
The fre~uency with which the inflammable materials serve as 
the initial combustible in ground fires is as follows: 
Initial combustible Cases Percent of 
known cases 
Gasoline 49 68 
Electrical insulation 8 11 
Lubricating oil 6 8i 
Hydraulic fluid 6 8].. 2 
De-icing alcohol 2 3 
Other solids 1 1 
Unknown 10 
Total cases 82 
The results show that gasoline was most frequently the initial 
combustible. Additional study of the gasoline-fire data indicated 
that 40 of the 68 percent of these fires occurred during the engine-
starting operation. Even if these fires are disregarded, the remain-
ing percentage indicates that gasoline remains the most frequent 
initial combustible in ground fires, as was the case in flight fires. 
Data for the study of crash fires were obtained predominantly 
from the reports of Civil Aeronautics Board accident investigations. 
Inasmuch as these investigations are usually made when an accident 
results in death or serious injury to personnel or considerable 
damage to the airplane, the data generally represent a more serious 
type of accident than the flight and ground fires and much of the 
evidence was destroyed by the resulting conflagration. 
The initial-combustible data for crash fires are presented in 
the following table. The percentages have been calculated on the 
basis of the total number of cases because the number of known cases 
is tdo small to be significant. 
__ J 
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Initial Cases Percent 
Combustible of total 
Gasoline 6 10 
Hydraulic fluid 1 l~ 
2 
Unknown 54 88~ 
2 
Total 61 
A comparison of the ~rcentage of fires that initially involved 
gasoline, 27 percent in flight and 68 percent on the ground, and 
consideration of the individual cases of flight and ground fires 
leads to the conclusion that gasoline is the most hazardous of the 
combustible materials involved in flight or ground fires. The partial 
indication given by the crash data plus consideration of gasoline 
characteristics gives no indication that the result would be markedly 
different for crash fires. Even when lubricating oil serves as a 
torch fire that ignites the bulk of the gasoline, the gasoline is 
responsible for the rapid spread of fire, the rapid increase in fire 
intensity, and the size of fire. 
A comparison of the physical characteristics that affect the 
relative inflammability of the various liquids shows that? although 
gasoline has a slightly higher spontaneous ignition temperature (2000 -
3000 F) it is much more volatile than either lubricating oil or 
hydraulic fluid. Thus the volatility of a combustible is apparently 
the most important factor in determining the fire hazard. The 
experience of commercial transport operators with Diesel engines 
indicates also that fuel volatility is an important factor in the fire 
hazard. The following quotation is from reference 2, page 192: 
"There has yet to be recorded an accident where the 
fuel oil ignited and burned on a Diesel-engined airplane. 
"In connection with lubricating oil fires, the ex-peri-
ence of Deutsche Lufthansa with one of their Junkers Ju 52 
airliners powered with three Junkers Jumo 205-C Diesels is 
of interest. While the airplane was flying in a fog, it 
• ~ ~ 
• 
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collided with a hill and cracked up and the entire 
supply of fuel oil was emptied over the wreckage. A 
lubricating oil fire broke out in the center engine 
and if the fuel had been gasoline, there can be little 
doubt but that the airplane would have burst into 
flames. The fuel oil did not catch fire, however, and 
one of the rescuers who hurried to the scene was able 
to quench the flames with an ordinary fire extinguisher." 
7 
This statement was written in 1940. The Junkers Jumo engine was 
placed in airline service about 1931 and the various models had been 
flown more than 59,000 hours by the end of 1938 (reference 2, p. 117); 
therefore, the experience cannot be considered insignificant. 
Liquids such as lubricating oil and hydraulic fluid, with flash 
temperatures above ambientooair temperature, must reach an ignition 
source in liquid form. This situation can occur when the liquid is 
sprayed, splashed, or runs by gravity. With a material such as 
gasoline, which has a flash temperature well below normal ambient-
air temperatures, the vapor is sufficiently concentrated that an 
inflammable mixture can eaSily be transported by air currents to an 
ignition source. Furthermore, gasoline crash fires are more 
difficult to extinguish than fires involving the less-volatile 
liquids (reference 1). Thus the conclusion that a highly volatile 
liquid such as gasoline is a hazardous aircraft fuel seems warranted. 
Ignition sources. - For the discussion of ignition sources, the 
following definitions apply: Electrical ignition sources are con-
sidered to be electrical sparks or arcs and electrical equipment that 
is elevated to the ignition temperature of the combustibles by the 
passage of excessive current. A backfire is ignition and burning of 
a combustible mi xture in the induction system at any position upstream 
of the intake valve. The miscellaneous ignition sources include 
matches, cigarettes, sliding friction, and sources not otherwise 
covered. 
The relative importance of the ignition sources is shown in 
subsequent tables. The following table shows the frequency with 
which various ignition sources started flight fires: 
L 
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Ignition source Cases Percent of 
known cases 
Electrical 38 38i 
Exhaust duct and gases 35 35],. 2 
Other miscellaneous 12 12 
Backfire 7 7 
Combustion heater 7 7 
Unknown 36 
Total 135 
The percentages indicate that the exhaust duct and gases and the 
electrical sources of ignition started fires with approximately equal 
frequency. An understanding of the comparative significance of these 
two ignition sources, however, requires a more careful analysis than 
is ~ossible by Simply counting the incidents in which each is involved. 
The electrical ~ower, communication, and instrument systems do not 
usually serve as ignition sources if properly enclosed, except when 
they are malfunctioning or being destroyed, and then are ignition 
sources for a comparatively short time. Investigation has shown 
(reference 3) that when a load-carrying conductor is short-circuited, 
the conductor most frequently burns through and opens the circuit and 
thus provides a potentially hazardous ignition source having a median 
life of only 0.6 second. The accident records show that electrical 
sources of ignition usually involve only the electrical insulation 
and result in small-volume fires. The conclusion is therefore 
reached that the hazard associated with electrical sources of ignition 
is not great, although one case in which electrical-equipment failure 
started a hydraulic-fluid fire did result in a serious accident. 
The ignition source represented by the exhaust-duct system and 
the exhaust gases, however, continuously exists throughout ~owered 
flight. The exhaust-duct system occupies a large volume and is 
necessarily located close to the lubricating-oil and gasoline-
plumbing systems, each of which can supply a considerable bulk of 
inflammable material. Exhaust-system ignited fires are consequently 
relatively severe, as shown by the flight-fire data. Considering 
the elapsed time of existence, volume occupied, proximity to bulk of 
combustible, and the generally minor damage of electrically ignited 
fires, it is concluded that the exhaust and its disposal system are 
the most hazardous flight-fire ignition sources. The frequency with 
which electrically ignited fires occur, however, indicate that the 
associated potential hazard should not be overlooked. 
• 
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The miscellaneous ignition sources included matches, cigarettes, 
a galley heating element, friction, and the compression of gases on 
the discharge side of vacuum pumps. 
The next table shows the frequency with which various ignition 
sources started ground fires. 
Ignition source Cases Percent of 
known cases 
Backfire 21 38 
Exhaust system 17 31 
Electrical igntion source 11 20 
Combustion heater 5 9 
Other 1 2 
Unknown 27 
Total """82 
The 21 backfire-ignited ground fires, which constitute the largest 
group, include 19 cases in which gasoline was involved and two cases 
in which carburetor de-icing alcohol was ignited. The majority of 
these fires attended the starting operations. Although the percentages 
indicate that backfires were the most frequent ignition source, the 
frequency of such fires showed a decreasing trend not evident in items 
presented in previous tables. The frequency of exhaust-system ignited 
fires, however, increased more rapidly than the increase in revenue 
hours shown by reference 4. It is therefore apparent that the exhaust 
system is currently the most frequent ground-fire ignition source. 
Crash-f ire i gni tion-source data are summarized as follows: 
Ignition Cases Percent 
source of total 
Sliding friction 2 3 
Unknown 59 97 
Total 61 
The relative importance of the various possible crash-fire ignition 
source s is not shown by the data because too many cases were unknown. 
This high unknown percentage will be discussed subsequently. 
Many potential ignition sources for crash fires exist: back-
fires, torching at exhaust-duct outlet, electrical-ignition sources 
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(arcs and short-circuited wiring), sliding friction, the hot metal 
of the exhaust-disposal system, and exhaust gases within the exhaust-
disposal system. In general, all the aforementioned ignition sources 
except the exhaust-disposal system exist for short periods of time. 
The exhaust system, however, exists as a potential ignition source 
throughout the dynamic phases of a crash and for a considerable 
period thereafter. The British found (reference 5) that the exhaust-
duct system was a serious ignition-source hazard and recommended 
that it be cooled or inerted. The U. S. Army Air Corps in a series 
of crash tests in 1924-25 with obsolete aircraft found that the 
exhaust stacks were the most important ignition source. The present 
exhaust-duct system is more extensive, handles larger volumes of 
gas, and is more closely confined than those in use at the time of 
the Air Corps tests and can be expected to have a higher ignition 
potential. Furthermore, the explosive fuel-air mixture in the 
induction system of carburetor-equipped engines is almost certain 
to be ignited by the hot exhaust valves and gases when the engine is 
forcibly stopped. The exhaust-disposal system thus causes a backfire 
and creates an additional hazard. The British recognize this danger 
and inject part of the fire-extinguishing medium into the induction 
system to reduce this possibility (reference 5). It would therefore 
be expected that the exhaust system is an important crash-fire 
ignition source at the present time, although no convincing data on 
this conclusion are available for modern aircraft. One of the primary 
purposes of crash-fire studies should be to obtain additional informa-
tion concerning the relative importance of the ignition sources. 
Primary causes of fire. - For the purpose of this discussion, 
the primary cause of a fire is defined as any malfunction or failure 
that results in the proximity of a combustible to an ignition source, 
or the creation of an ignition source within effective proximity of 
a combustible material. Engine failures are considered to include 
only failures of the engine assembly as delivered by the engine 
manufacturer and do not include the entire power-plant installation. 
The failure of maintenance or operating personnel to maintain equip-
ment properly or to operate equipment according to established rules 
is considered a personnel failure. A basic engine, airframe, or 
accessory design feature that results in recurring failure or 
undesirable event, even though operation is by experienced personnel 
and according to normal procedure, is designated a design fault. 
The following table shows the relative frequency with which 
the various primary causes were responsible for flight fires: 
• 
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Cause Cases Percent of 
known cases 
Engine failure 43 36 
Electrical-power-system failure 23 19.1-2 
Exhaust-system failure 8 7 
Design fault 8 7 
Air-conditioning-system failure 7 6 
Personnel failure 7 6 
Fuel-plumbing-system failure 5 4 
Propeller failure 4 3~ 
Lubricating-oil-system failure 2 2 
Hydraulic-system failure 1 1 
Other 11 8 
Unknown 16 
Total cases 135 
The percentages show that engine failures were responsible for 
the largest number of flight fires. A study of the number of fires 
caused by engine failures and the revenue hours flown per year 
(reference 4) shows that the number of engine-failure fires per 
100,000 revenue hours gradually decreased from approximately 0.4 in 
1938 to 0.064 in 1945, increased to 0.525 in 1946 and decreased 
slightly to 0.5 in 1947. The sudden increase in engine-failure 
fires was probably due to the simultaneous introduction of new 
engines and airframes in air-transport service. The gradual increase 
in reliability to be expected as the troubles attending the intro-
duction of new models are eliminated will reduce the number of 
engine-failure fires. 
The following system failures or cause factors resulted in 
ground fires: 
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Cause Cases Percent of 
known cases 
Fuel-plumbing-system failure 22 30 
Design fault 18 25 
Electrical-power-system failure 8 11 
Personnel failure 7 sl 
Hydraulic-system failure 5 72 
Exhaust-system failure 3 4 
Air-conditioning-system failure 3 4 
Engine failure 2 3 
Fuel-storage-system failure 1 11 
Other 4 5-
Unknown 9 2 
Total 82 
The largest number of ground fires were the result of fuel-
plumbing failures and inadequate design. Fires attributed to the 
design factor were predominantly gasoline-fed backfire-ignited 
fires, which attended the starting operation and are characteristic 
of the engine-induct ion-system design. Inasmuch as the frequency 
of backfire-ignited fires has decreased, the design-fault percentage 
is too high to be representative of current conditions. 
The failures of the fuel plumbing are typical for standard tub-
ing systems. The follOWing examples are taken from operator's 
reports: Primer line failure, pressure -gage line failure, leaky 
primer connection, loose carburetor vent line, leaking hose connection, 
leaking oil dilution solenoid valve, fuel-flowmeter line failed, heater 
fuel connection loose, fuel-pump leakage, fuel-pressure line chafed 
through, and T-fitting in vent line broken. The number of fuel-
plumbing-system fires per uhit of revenue hours has not shown a con-
sistently decreasing trend, although introduction of the flexible-
hose assembly did reduce the fuel-line troubles (reference 4). 
Plumbing failures are therefore concluded to be the most important 
single source of ground fires. 
The primary causes of crash fires are as follows: 
- -------
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Cause Cases Percent 
of total 
Fuel-storage-system failure 3 5 
Engine failure 1 l~ 2 
Hydraulic-system failure 1 11 2 
Fuel-plumbing-system failure 1 11. 
2 
Unknown 55 90~ 
2 
Total cases 61 
Although the unknown percentage is so large that other percentages in 
the table are not numerically significant, it is noted that failure of 
the fuel tanks is one of the causes of crash fires. British studies 
(reference 5) show that fuel spillage is an important factor in 
crash fires and specific proposals for reducing the hazard have been 
made. These proposals include the use of more crash-resistant fuel 
tanks, removing plumbing connections from the bottom of the tanks, 
routing plumbing and locating tanks in zones where the possibility 
of damage is reduced, and installing automatic shut-off valves to 
stop the flow from broken fuel lines. 
In determining the over-all significance of fuel-plumbing and 
fuel-storage system failures, flight, ground, and crash fires must 
all be considered. The data show that 30 percent of ground fires 
and 4 percent of flight fires are caused by fuel-plumbing failures. 
The quantitative importance of these failures for crash fires is 
unknown but is probably considerable. It is thus apparent that the 
fuel-plumbing system requires additional development, better main-
tenance, or both, if the number of fires attending such failures 
is to be significantly reduced. The development of a better fuel-
plumbing system that could be applied to aircraft now in use with-
out major modifications in airplane configuration would lead to an 
immediate reduction in the fire hazard. 
Prevalent combinations of initial combustible, ignition source, 
and cause. - Data on initial combustibles, ignition sources, and 
causes of fires have been presented. The significant combinations 
of initial combustible, ignition source, and primary cause for 
ground and flight fires are indicated in figures 1 and 2, respectively. 
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Such patterns were not prepared for the crash fires because of the 
small number of known cases. When gasoline was the initial combustible 
in flight fires (fig. 2), it was usually ignited by either the exhaust-
disposal system or a backfire and the cause was some form of engine 
failure. When gasoline was the initial combustible in ground fires 
(fig. 1), there were two typical fire patterns: gasoline ignited by 
various ignition sources and caused by fuel-plumbing failures, and 
gasoline ignited by a backfire and caused by inherent characteristics 
of the induction-system design. Lubricating-oil flight fires (fig. 2) 
were generally ignited by the exhaust system and the oil was spilled 
by an engine failure. Of the flight fires in which the initial com-
bustible could have been either gasoline or lubricating oil (fig. 2), 
most of the fires were started by the exhaust system and all of them 
were caused by engine failure. Ground fires that started with the 
lubricating oil were ignited by the exhaust system, but the primary 
cause of the fire was generally unknown. 
Considering both gasoline and lubricating oil as initial com-
bustibles, the records indicate that the exhaust system is the most 
important ignition source for gasoline and oil flight fires and that 
engine malfunction or breakup is the most frequent cause of such 
fires. Out of 56 such flight fires, 28 were ignited by the exhaust 
system and 35 were caused by engine failure or breakup. At least half 
of the ground fires involving hydraulic fluid were ignited by the exhaust 
system and failure of the hydraulic system was usually responsible. 
In considering remedial measures that might be applied to the 
airplane-fire problem, the following methods of approach are pos-
sible: Eliminate the combustible or reduce its inflammability; 
eliminate the ignition source or reduce its ignition potential; 
eliminate the oxygen in the volume by providing an inert gas to 
dilute the oxygen concentration below inflammable limits; eliminate 
the primary cause of the fire; or find means of reducing the hazard 
associated yTi th the primary cause. Combinations of two or more of 
these measures may offer a more practical solution in a particular 
problem than the full use of a single measure. 
In applying these measures to the typical fires described, it 
is immediately obvious that the fuel cannot be eliminated as a com-
bustible, although a fuel less inflammable than gasoline might be 
substituted. The problems associated with such a solution are 
being studied by various aviation organizations. The possibility 
of a relatively noninflammable lubricating oil cannot be overlooked 
and the commercial announcement of less-inflammable hydraulic 
fluids indicates that some progress is being made toward this objec-
tive. Complete elimination of the exhaust-disposal system as an 
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ignition source appears remote, but measures that would red~ce its 
ignition potential must be found and tested. Experience has shown 
that the hazard of backfires as an ignition source can be further 
reduced by the use of direct fuel injection. Inerting of zones 
occupied by fuel lines may offer some advantage for flight and 
ground operation, but little advantage during crash conditions. 
The possibility of eliminating fires by the use of a more reliable 
power plant and fuel-plumbing system should certainly be considered, 
because greater engine plumbing reliability would also result in 
greater operational reliability. Use of lower power ratings on 
current engines and closer engine supervision to shut down engines 
giving indications of incipient failure may be possible partial 
solutions. Use of direct fuel injection instead of a carburetor 
system to eliminate a fuel-air mixture in the impeller housing would 
eliminate the hazard attending impeller failures, loose intake pipes, 
and failures in which the fuel-air mixture escapes into the nacelle. 
This system has reduced induction-system fires on at least one model 
of military airplane. 
The patterns of flight fires involving electrical insulation 
(fig. 2) show that the ignition source is usually electrical. 
Failures listed as "other" are communications and electrical-
instrument system failures; therefore, about 80 percent of electrical 
flight fires are caused by failure of electrical-power system, 
communication system, or electrically operated instruments. Patterns 
for ground fires (fig. 1) involving electrical insulation are similar 
to flight patterns. All possible means of reducing the electrical-
insulation fire hazard must be studied, although the most promising 
measures are the removal of inflammable material, which is already 
in progress, and better maintenance and design to increase the general 
r eliability of electrical systems. 
The data indicate that no particular combinations of ignition 
s ource and cause predominated when the initial combustible was 
unknown. Apparently the known cases constitute a representative 
sample and the results are dependable for the flight-and ground-
fire conditions. 
General remarks. - The outstanding feature shawn by the tables 
of crash-fire results is the large unknown percentages. In approxi-
mately 90 percent of the cases, the initial combustible, ignition 
s ource , or cause were unknown. Two reasons for this situation can be 
given : (1) Nearly all crash fires either initially or finally involve 
gasoline and thus develop rapidly into a fire of such magnitude that 
all evi dence of the tnitial combustible or breakup that preceded the 
start of the fire is destroyed. (2) The accident was investigated to 
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determine its cause, not why or how a fire ensued. When the crash 
was caused by fire, the investigation generally indicated the initial 
inflammable and allied dataj when fire was incidental, little infor-
mation concerning the fire factors was noted or determined. Additional 
information concerning the causes and the physical mechanism of crash 
fires is needed if the hazard is to be reduced. Inasmuch as future 
accidents can provide operational information, each crash accident, 
regardless of whether fire did or did not occur, should be studied 
to obtain data that will relate the occurrence and the spread of 
fire to airplane design and operation. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
An analysis of CAA and CAB commercial transport airplane fire 
records shows that: 
1. Gasoline was moat frequently the initial combustible in 
flight and ground fires and is considered to be the most hazardous 
of the combustibles. 
2. Although electrical-ignition sources are the most frequent 
flight-fire ignition source by a small margin, the exhaust system is 
concluded to be the most hazardous ignition source because it is 
necessarily located near the lubric~~ing-oil and gasoline-plumbing 
systems and the resulting fires are relatively severe. The electrical-
ignition sources usually involve only the electri,cal insulation and 
result in small-volume fires. The exhaust system was found to be the 
most frequent ground-fire ignition source. 
3. Engine failures were the most frequent cause of the union of 
combustible and ignition source that resulted in flight fires. 
4. Fuel-plumbing-syatem failures were the most frequent cause 
of fires occurring during ground operation. 
5. The evidence concerning crash fires was not sufficiently 
extensive to provide information concerning the factors that affect 
the start and the spread of fire. In order that future records 
may be more useful, all crash accidents should be studied to 
determine why fire does or does not occur and to establish data that 
r elate the occurrence and the spread of fire to airplane design and 
operation. 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 
Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, 
Cleveland, Ohio. 
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